One particular topic in the literature on Frege's conception of sense relates to two apparently contradictory theses held by Frege: the isomorphism of thought and language on one hand and the expressibility of a thought by different sentences on the other. I will divide the paper into five sections. In (1) I introduce the problem of the tension in Frege's thought. In (2) 
Introduction
From 1891 onwards, the concept of conceptual content defined in Frege's Begriffsschrift splits into three different notions: sense, reference and extension. However, Frege applied the tripartite distinction only to predicates; for names and sentences, he used only the distinction between sense and reference, identifying reference with extension. The concept of thought became constantly referred to as the sense of a sentence. The identification of the thought with the sense of a sentence hides a tension in Frege's conception of thought. This tension is manifested by his simultaneously holding two different claims, which at some point evidently clash. Frege held that a single thought can be expressed by different sentences, yet at the same time he held that a sentence is a picture of the thought it expresses. What's wrong with this position? Why can't we simply think of different sentences as different ways to picture one thought? An extreme interpretation of this idea -that a sentence is a picture of a thought -implies that there is a strict correspondence between the elements of the thought and the elements of the sentence. Such a view suggests that there must be one -and only one -analysis of a thought which is mirrored by a unique sentence; this is contrary to the idea that many different distinction in the background. In general, see Dummett (1973), p.65; , ch. 15. Briefly stated: while there are many of a sentence, there is only one of it; and it is the analysis which is relevant to its sense. For this, to be faithful to Frege's intentions, there cannot be two sentences differing in essential structure but expressing the same sense , p.327). Dummett's claims have been challenged by Levine 2002 . I will give here a different criticism of the consequences of Dummett's solution. 3 Frege has shown us the formation and fruitfulness of logical thinking: we may decompose a judgment (via extraction of functions) and pick a pattern common to many different sentences to arrive at a new concept. Once the pattern is picked up, we have to keep it as the common structure of different thoughts. The patterns discovered in logical proofs derive from our discernment of what is not immediately apparent, but was there to be discerned. See for instance Dummett (1981), p.277; Dummett (1991) pp.195-199 . 4 The uniqueness of analysis of the sentence is relative to the semantic theory adopted; within that theory, the construction of each sentence must be unique, on pain of ambiguity , p.291) 5 For Frege, expressions such as <<there is at least one square root of 4>> or <<the concept square root of four is realized>> or <<the number 4 has the property that there is something of which it is the square>> are different sentences expressing the same thought. But when we decide to give a reconstruction in a quantificational language, the analysis will be unique: ∃ x √4x has one and only one analysis in constituents when considered as part of a formalized language that aims for a perspicuous representation of the pure thought. logical language, where everything is explicit and the distinction in function and argument is clearly expressed, then for any sentence in our language there will correspond one -and only one-determinate thought, and consequently, thesis [2] firmly holds. We might call this last claim the thesis of logical isomorphism. It has a certain appeal with respect to the Fregean idea of revealing the real structure of the thought with logical notation. Even if basically correct, however, Dummett's solution has some evident disadvantages. On the one hand, it reduces the thesis of isomorphism of thought and language to a tautology, for if a given sentence is not considered isomorphic with the thought it expresses, then it is just a sentence which does not convey that thought in its most fundamental form. And in such circumstances, it is unclear how to decide which is the most fundamental form of the thought (see Beaney 1996, p. 242 
A2
The direction of a = the direction of b.
B1
There are as many Fs as Gs.
B2
The number of Fs is the same as the number of Gs.
To these we may add the corresponding Axiom V of Grundgesetze, which is composed by the pair B1/B2 in more technical jargon:
B1' For every a (f(a) = g(a))
B2' The value range of f = the value range of g Dummett finds it very difficult to reconcile the idea that these pairs express the same sense with later ideas hold by Frege concerning the difference of senses 2 . Eventually Dummett claims that Frege was wrong in accepting the thesis that each sentence in the Grundlagen pairs expresses the same sense, and that he changed his mind, especially regarding Axiom V. According to Dummett, in the Grundgesetze Frege no longer accepted the idea that the two sides of Axiom V expressed the same sense. The rationale that Dummett gives for this 1 We may say, like , p.332, that Frege believes that to grasp the sense of 'and' we have to recognize that the conjunction is commutative and idempotent. It is not clear, however, how much has to be recognized to grasp the sense of more complex formulas. This point regarding the problem of sense understanding will be developed later ( § 3, sec.5). 3 Dummett (1989) , p.299. Currie's distinction is related to two different internal needs in Frege's philosophy of mathematics: (a) the problem of establishing identity of reference between numerical designators; (b) the problem of explaining the non-triviality of mathematical truths considered as analytical. Dummett probably agrees on the second point, while he disagrees on the first. The theory of strong sense which justifies (a) can be considered a method by which we can come to know that two expressions refer to the same object, thus ensuring conceptual continuity between ordinary arithmetic and his logical form, without invoking arithmetical proof, empirical procedures, or any direct intuition of the nature of numbers (Currie 1982, p.17) . 4 Currie (1985) , Garavaso (1991) and Bell (1997) are thus two ways of expressing the same thought, and no language would be ideal in which that principle could be not expressed (294). On the other hand, according to Currie, thesis
[2] -and the idea that a thought is build on constituents which correspond, by and large, to the parts of the sentence -cannot be considered an ontological claim, but only an epistemological one. To understand a thought, we need to have some sentence whose structure expresses the structure of the thought.
The distinction between the epistemological and non-epistemological (iii) ultimately, the conception of thought as unarticulated conceptual content does not fit the logical study of pure thought which was Frege's main concern. The idea of unarticulated conceptual content might perhaps be more applicable to a psychological study of mental processes, where thinking could be defined as the process of making a structure emerge from a previously unstructured (neural) network. If this is indeed a possible interpretation of unstructured thought, then we are here very far away from
Frege's concern.
To summarize, I accept Dummett's criticism on thought as unstructured content. I also accept, however, contrary to Dummett, the idea that there is a hidden tension in
Frege's conception of sense. I disagree with the specific solutions to this tension given by Currie and Bell. The first offers an interpretation too narrow for a sound conception of thought, and the second cuts too neatly between thought and sense, transforming thought into an unstructured element of the mind and sense into linguistic meaning 2 . In contrast with these claims I will suggest another way out, which is coherent with Frege's main tenets, even if it needs some revision of Frege's classification of sense and reference. I will begin with the textual evidence (part 3), and then I will try to show how Frege was partly unaware of two really contrasting uses of sense and thought found in his own work (part 4). I will then give some tentative conclusions.
Criteria for Identity
As Dummett 1981 suggests, we must scrutinize carefully the comparatively rare cases in which Frege positively asserts that distinct sentences express the same thought.
These instances occur mostly in the scattered definitions of a criterion for identity, as well as in few other passages. Frege gave at least four different criteria for identity of thoughts:
(1) Criterion based on inferential potential (general substitutability).
(2) Criterion based on immediate recognition.
(3) Criterion based on logical equivalence.
(4) Criterion based on substitutability in indirect contexts.
(1) Inferential potential (sense as inferential content) . This is the basic definition of sense-identity in the Begriffsschrift ( § 3), a (dynamic) definition that Frege never rejected.
Even if two sentences in active and passive form have a slight difference in sense (eine geringe Verschiedenheit des Sinnes), they mostly give preponderant agreement in sense.
Frege speaks of conceptual content as the part of the content which is the same in both.
Two judgments have the same conceptual content if the conclusions that can be drawn from one when combined with certain others also always follow from the second when combined with the same judgments. What the two judgments have in common is their substitutability in inferences, or their inferential power, or the ability to preserve the same consequences. The idea of sense as inferential potential is the core of a definition of sense, or conceptual content, based on substitutability, as Brandom 1994 has abundantly shown.
Frege's definition of content, however, is given before the distinction is made between sense and reference and could be used for both If we take definition (b), we may consider it to be either a source for or a possible anticipation of sense as a truth condition. Marconi 1991 points out that if inferential potential is defined with respect to some logic L and L is complete with respect to some semantic S, then sense-as-inferential-potential is the same as sense-as-truth-conditions, where truth conditions are given in terms of S.
There is, however, some problem here with the 'slight differences in sense'.
Depending on which collateral judgments and peculiar interests we take into account, the slight difference in sense which Frege spoke about could become relevant for deduction. In that case, if we still wanted to identify conceptual content with logical equivalence, we should at least make logical equivalence relative to contexts of possible collateral judgments.
Frege's 'small difference of sense' is typically considered in light of the reciprocal influence of speaker and listener. The relation between speakers is something Frege assumes not to be of concern to logic. However, if we enlarge the scope of logic from a representation of mathematical reasoning to a representation of common sense reasoning, we have to touch upon pragmatic problems of competence and communication (think of Gricean implicatures). We might therefore use the criterion of inferential potential to define a concept of equivalence more fine grained than that of logical equivalence. The general criterion stated in the Begriffsschrift should therefore be considered a programmatic one, which can have different levels of application and refinement.
(2) Intuitive recognizability (transparency of sense). Criterion (2) is the following:
two sentences which we understand express the same thought if we cannot understand a thought as expressed by one sentence without recognizing that it is the same as the thought expressed by another sentence. seems to dismiss the principle (NS 227), saying that instead of analyzing a given expression through a synonymous one, we can give a stipulation for using B instead of A.
This criterion is explicitly stated in
These oscillations on Frege's side cast some doubts on the reliability of this criterion.
However, even if not generally accepted in all stages of Frege's work, this criterion may explain Frege's claims for the identity of content in the Grundlagen pairs. In
Grundgesetze, Frege warns that a dispute might break out over Axiom V because the two sides of the Axiom did not satisfy completely the requirement of intuitive recognisability.
Dummett takes this remark as grounds for claiming that Frege no longer considered the two sides of the axiom to have the same sense or to express the same thought. But the fact that the two sides of axiom V do not have the same sense is not the problem here. They should have possessed the same sense if they worked. 1 Actually, the passage quoted above is related to a discussion on the difference between Frege's view and Peano's. Frege shows that if we follow Peano, with admissible transformations given by contraposition, the referents of the letters may be modified with damage to logical clarity. The general point that there is a slight different in sense even in logically equivalent formulas is developed in Penco 2002. Here it is shown that Frege have treated expressions like A -> B and ¬ (A & ¬ B) as differing in sense, if he had used -instead of using a conception of absolute rationality in logic -a conception of limited rationality. 2 Calling it 'cognitive' might cause confusion because the conception of semantic sense also has a cognitive aspect (see later at § 4).
The 'locus classicus' of the intuitive criterion of the difference of thoughts is Evans (1982, p.18 Taken together, the four criteria discussed above are not consistent, and each of them has its own difficulties. We have seen that the first criterion is vague enough to give rise to different interpretations. I will describe in more detail some of the difficulties with the other criteria.
The second criterion of immediate recognizability does not conflict per se with the conception of thought as truth condition if we take into account the restriction given in (2) that we have no difficulty in grasping the senses. In fact, we may recognize immediately two sentences as logically equivalent if we grasp their respective truth conditions. This interpretation also fits the examples given by Frege when he speaks about the composition of thoughts. Why do we immediately grasp the identity of the thoughts 'A B' and 'B A' or 'A B' and '¬ A B'? An answer could be that it is easy for us to grasp their truth conditions, therefore it is easy to see that the two sentences express the same truth condition and therefore the same sense. This step does not apply in the case of empirical propositions, where it is not immediately recognizable that they express the same truth condition ('Hesperus is a planet' and 'Phosphorus is a planet').
However, in speaking of sense as linked to immediate recognition (2), we are always in the empirical realm: people often do not know, are unaware of, or find it difficult to realize completely the sense of an expression. Frege himself refers often to this problem:
even mathematicians have difficulty in acknowledging the sense of some complex mathematical operations or functions. This point poses a problem about transparency of senses.
1
If we admit that we are often unable to grasp senses fully, how can we recognize
1 The contrast between claims about and claims about of grasping a sense in Frege's writings has been discussed by Burge (1990) and criticized by Kemp (1996) should perform if we (or the ideal mind or machine) are to make the appropriate substitutions that result from immediate recognition. We are then back to the problem of the structure of substitutability.
The criterion of substitutability in indirect speech (4) seems to be a specification of the substitution strategy that lies at the heart of the general definition (1). It is, however, not easy to make criterion (4) match the other two remaining criteria. We cannot use (4) together with the conception of sense identity as logical equivalence (3): we would reach the unwanted conclusion of the speaker's logical omniscience -a problem which has caused so much trouble to the philosophical community after Frege. If we identify sense identity with logical equivalence and, at the same time, allow the substitution of logically equivalent sentences in indirect contexts, we fall into the standard argument: if s knows that 2+2=4
and 2+2=4 is logically equivalent to any other mathematical or logical truth, then s knows every mathematical or logical truth. Hence, we would have to claim that every speaker who knows or believes a logical or mathematical truth also knows or believes all logical or Brandom (1994) , ch.8. The topic of transparency also poses a problem with the treatment of Frege's analyticity presented by Boghossian (1996) . Here we need the speaker's full awareness of senses in order to have analyticity. 1 Think of the way Frege in (p.74) describes the task of logic and mathematics as the investigation of mind; of mind, not of minds.
Stjernberg () and Stuhlmann-Laeisz 1995 give a solution of this sort, using the notion of an ideal subject or mind which makes the logical criterion compatible and easily transformed into an (ideal) epistemic criterion: sentence A expresses the same thought as sentence B if and only if an ideal subject cannot believe that A is true and at the same time believe that B is false (and vice versa). Therefore, the criterion of substitutability in indirect speech could still be used as a viable criterion of sense identity (throught something like intensional isomorphism), given a presupposed notion of sense recognition (or the ability to grasp the sense). In this respect, the criterion of substitutability is similar to the criterion of immediate recognition: both depend on the concept of sense understanding.
Dummett claims that the problem of sense understanding is the main problem in
Frege, and that we should set aside the problem of synonymy to concentrate on the problem of grasping the sense. If we concentrate on the problem of sense understanding, however, it seems really difficult to give an objective representation of the structure of thought, unless we do so in terms of one's ability to make the right substitutions. We end up running in a circle: to have a notion of grasping the sense, we need a notion of correct substitutions. But, as we have already seen, to have a viable notion of substitution, we need a notion of grasping the sense.
This circle could be broken in two different ways: the first is to follow a Wittgensteinian strategy, defining grasping the sense as the ability to follow rules, with no 
Constant Oscillation between Different Concerns
1 I will not follow this line of thought here, just hint at it. The clash between immediate recognition and substitutivity deals with the contrast between intuition and proof. Immediate recognition of sameness of sense implies substitutivity, but also vice-versa: we have always to resort to some kind of pattern recognition to ascertain whether some substitution is allowed. Hilbert spoke of the intuition of symbols, and so did Wittgenstein in the In the Wittgenstein discussed the surveyability of the proof and the problem of pattern recognition. Frege, in (p. 39) , thinks of the criteria of immediate recognition referring to the most elementary steps in a proof: that 'A and B' has the same sense as 'B and A' we may see without proof by merely being aware of the sense. In fact, what Frege says here implies that at least in most of the more complex cases we need a proof to check whether two sentences have the same sense. And a proof is made of individual steps of which each should be surveyable and immediately recognizable. However, if we take the conception of sense as truth condition and truth table methods as one example of such a proof, we cannot avoid the conclusion that all logical truths of propositional calculus have the same sense. And certainly this was not a welcome result of Frege's notion of pure thought, whose purpose was also to distinguish parts inside the realm of the True. The fact that Frege did not pursue coherently this analysis of sense and meaning probably helped to nourish Wittgensteins work on the problem of immediate recognition in the elementary steps of proofs. This problem, summed up by Brouwer's discussion on intuition at each step of a proof, eventually brought Wittgenstein to develop the argument of rule-following. For a discussion of the abandonment of pattern-recognition analysis in Wittgenstein, see Penco (1994 This is contrary to the idea that, being logically equivalent, the two sentences should express the same thought.
However, discussions that leads towards the idea of thought equivalence as logical equivalence never encounter the problem of the cognitive value of identity statements. This last problem normally appears within discussions that clarify the distinction between sense and reference and justify the informativeness of assertions of identity. When Frege 1 See the notes taken by Carnap and edited by Gabriel (here:Frege 1996) .
2 WB p.67. Frege read Wittgenstein's while submitting his paper 'Der Gedanke' for publication (actually, he wrote to Wittgenstein that he couldn't get beyond the first definitions fo the book, but we may assume that at least he gave a look at it). His terminology itself is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's. 3 A further argument on limited rationality should be required for the rationality of simultaneous holding the two basic sentences. See on that Penco 2002. says that two sentences with the same truth-value may express different thoughts, i.e. different senses, he most often raises the problem of changes in sense provoked by substitutions of co-referential elements in a sentence. When he speaks of identity of thoughts, he is almost always preoccupied with the other concerns relating to the difference of sense and tone we have discussed above. There are therefore two lines of preoccupation which lead to the contemplation of two different aspects of the sense of a sentence; these two lines of preoccupation are typically given in different contexts -even if in the same paper. They don't clash with one another explicitly; another reason for this is the still embryonic state of the characterization of sense (and therefore thought) as truth condition.
The differentiation between semantic and epistemic conceptions of sense does not need to be reduced to a difference of ontological vs. epistemological points of view. The epistemic conception of sense reveals an intrinsic aspect of thought, i.e. the different ways in which a thought can be expressed: it is essential to the thought that it be thinkable in different ways. We may devise canonical forms to express a class of logically equivalent expressions. Pragmatic considerations may press us to devise and use different formulations, but these pragmatic considerations rely on an intrinsic aspect of the structure of thought. A thought has per se different ways of being expressed, all of them relying on the basic structure expressed by the truth condition. A thought -as truth condition -has always to be taken together with the different procedures through which we arrive at determining the truth condition. These procedures may be considered to be the accessibility conditions of thoughts. From a Fregean point of view, we might say that these procedures do not depend on human beings, but are intrinsic to the thought.
Summarizing: the oscillation in Frege's theory between criteria of identity and difference of senses reflects an internal tension between two different conceptions of sense whose contrast Frege never became aware of; there were reasons, however, why he was unaware of the tension. First of all, he treated each of these two conceptions of sense in different contexts which responded to distinct concerns.
1
I have tried to give here some suggestions for the ways in which we might see his discussion of sense as encapsulated in different contexts and concerns that prevented him from recognizing the possibility of contradictions that would have arisen if he had compared the different principles underlying his definitions of thought as sense of a sentence. I will now consider some further motivations for Frege's inability to resolve the tension caused by a possible contradiction in his claims and suggest a way in which his system could have developed a clear distinction to solve the claim.
Why Frege Didn't Get It Right:
1 Picardi 1993 has insisted on the many different preoccupations that lie behind Fregean attempts to give a criterion for identity of thoughts. We might distinguish in this way different categories of synonymous pairs of sentences. Think for instance of synonymous sentences which (i) differ in tone, (ii) differ in grammatical construction, (iii) are paraphrases or elucidations (iv) are logical transformations. I follow here a more basic distinction, which is compatible with a more detailed analysis of these differences.
Hints Toward a Reconstruction of Fregean Thought
A criterion of identity between thoughts that is more fine-grained than logical equivalence is not easy to give. In his first 1906 letter to Husserl, after having defined logical equivalence (equipollence) as the criterion of identity of thoughts, Frege hints at the problem of a more restricted idea of equivalence: the problem of congruence between thoughts. The problem of the definition of a relation of identity more fine grained than logical equivalence has been debated almost a hundred years. The distinctions between intension and intensional structure (Carnap) , between equivalence and strong equivalence (Barwise and Perry) , between content and character (Kaplan) , between sense and thought (Perry) , between structured propositions and modes of presentation (Schiffer) , between truth conditional content and representational content (Kamp) , between ingredient sense and assertoric content (Dummett) and between subjunctive intensions and epistemic intensions (Chalmers) can be interpreted as variations on this theme.
2
Evans , McDowell 1984 , and Recanati 1993 have suggested that direct reference theories can be considered variants of the Fregean theory or at least that their difference is more superficial than substantive. A deeper continuity in the recent history of philosophy of language could be better understood by realizing how these attempts to characterize a multiplicity of levels of meaning are dealing with and explicilty expressing 1 See Frege's first letter to Husserl in 1906 in WB, passim. In par.65, p.76 Frege, referring to the difference between (the same) and (equal), comments: may appear to express complete agreement, only agreement in this or that respect. Soon Frege leaves the question of the difference between the two terms unanswered, and relies on Universal Substitutability which contains all the laws of identity. This solution could be considered another clue as to why he chooses to give no answer to the problem of giving a criterion stricter than logical equivalence. Maybe this is also a reason why he never stated any precise criterion of for his epistemic conception of sense (congruence?), but suggested only an intuitive criterion of . For these reasons, it is difficult to present a clear Fregean idea of substitutivity of synonyms, as required for Boghossians Fregean Analyticity. 2 A proliferation of distinctions of different levels of sense has also developed within direct reference theories -see Almog (1984) , Corazza (1995) , Hahn (1995 ), Braun (1996 . Perry (1977) suggested, after Kaplan's distinction between character and content, making a break between 'sense' -which is entertained -and 'thought' -which is apprehended. Perry's distinction and some of his arguments are one source for what I have been discussing here. The conception of thought entertained by Perry looks too unfregean, however, to be proposed as a development of a Fregean theory of thought, and his theory of sense in that paper tends to reduce sense to linguistic meaning. Later (2001), Perry develops a different strategy, distinguishing three levels of analysis of content, which he finds implicit in and abolished in . In ,we have Truth value at the level of and thought at the level of . What disappears from the scene is the subject matter, the situation represented, or how the things would be if the sentence were true. Actually Perry speaks of three kinds of propositions: the mode-of-designation proposition, the subject-matter proposition and the mode-of-presentation proposition. I will not follow his terminology here in order to stay within the Fregean terminology, up to a certain point.
Frege's hidden ambiguity on the notion of thought as sense of a sentence. We are still searching for a unifying theory that could clarify the connection between the semantic and the epistemic aspects of the Fregean notion of thought . Furthermore, he claimed that a property of a thought will be called inessential if it consists in, or follows from, the fact that this thought is grasped by a thinker.
3
Thoughts, although they can be grasped by the minds of single speakers, are completely autonomous of such mental processes; therefore, their definition must be independent of the different ways that speakers use in grasping them.
But is it really necessary to get involved in the working of actual mental processes in order to define epistemic senses? We might just speak, instead, of the different ways a thought can be expressed, or the different ways a mathematical proposition can be computed. This was how Frege used to explain the difference between sense and reference in his letters to Peano and Russell. There is a cognitive value in the fact that different computational structures such as 7=7 and 52 211-4/753 = 7 give the same Truth Value.
They not only give the same truth value, but -assuming the logicistic reduction of arithmetic to logic -they are also logically equivalent, that is they have the same truth condition (we would say now that they are true in all possible worlds). What then are these computational structures? Certainly not mental processes, even if they may be reproduced by mental processes.
The cognitive or epistemic sense as represented or given by computational procedures characterizes the difference between logically equivalent expressions like the ones given above. But this approach can be easily extended to other kinds of sentences, and we may say that the procedure to compute A -> B is different from the procedure to 1 A discussion of the search for a unified theory (and a criticism of the attempt made by Chalmers) is given in Marconi, . have different (epistemic) senses (the differences resulting from the complexity of the formulae).
All this is apparently very sketchy and points towards a rational reconstruction of some of Frege's ideas that can resolve the contradictory tensions in Frege's logic analysed above. We shall give here a hint towards how such reconstruction might be achieved, a topic which deserves more extensive discussion. Accepting, for the sake of simplicity, the modern terminology for intension as functions from possible words to extensions, we might sketch the development of the tripartite Fregean schema in the following way: ..are what they are'. The idea might also be reversed saying that unstructured propositions are what they are only insofar they are accessible by structured meanings. But the debate is ambiguous; the distinction between unstructured and structured propositions is compared to the hypotetical distinction between 'coarse grained numbers' such as 12 and 'fine grained numbers' such as <+,5,7>. We may accept that numbers are objects named by numerals like propositions are objects named by sentences. However numbers are given only in a system in which it is essential (or internal property) of each number to be computed in different ways inside the system. Numbers do not stay alone in the series of numbers but belong to a structure of calculation. Without that, they would be unconceivable. It might be asked whether this attempt is still a 'Fregean' conception of thought.
Certainly, it does not follow the Basic Criteria for a Fregean Representation of Thought
given by Bell 1987. In fact, Bell's criteria have to change if we maintain a conception of thought that allows a thought to be considered together with its objective ways of being thinkable. Our criteria will therefore be different from the classical ones insofar as we need to distinguish semantic sense (Thought) and epistemic sense (Thinking). We might propose some criteria along the following lines:
1) Thought as the referent of a sentence (the state of affairs represented or the truth condition) may be given by a formula in a canonical form (think, for example, to the disjunctive normal form in propositional logic). Grasping a thought is to understand the truth condition represented by the sentence. Certainly this is a major change from the Fregean setting, but the separation between reference (truth condition) and extension (truth-value) of sentences justifies it. This change leaves open a space for the sense of a sentence in the following way:
2) The canonical expression of a thought corresponds to a class of equivalent expressions.
The different expressions represent either different ways in which the same truth condition is given or different associated procedures. They give our epistemic accessibility to the Thought, to the different senses in which a Thought is presented.
3) These different ways of getting at a unique structure must be taken as intrinsic to Thought, and not dependent upon our psychology. When expressed in a language, however, they represent our explicit representation of the working of the Thought.
4) The semantic and epistemic aspects of Thought must comply with compositionality.
As far as truth condition is concerned, this is already clear in model theoretic tradition. As far as senses as procedures are concerned, we rely on the wide discussion in A.I. about compositionality of procedures
With the development of intelligent systems, we have to better work out a computational theory of thought (or, as we could put it after Frege, of a computational theory of 'the' mind). From the point of view of a computational theory of thought, we may say that truth conditions and the way to get at them are both part of the objective structure of the Thought. The thought is not an unstructured content, but something that intrinsically comes with its own different ways of thinking it. Thoughts, or thinkables, are to be studied at different levels of complexity: intensions are the most unifying structures, representing the basic semantic stuff; procedures attached to intensions are the ways to make intensions realized in different ways. Frege's tensions could be overcome by defining Thought as a multi-level structure: both as intension and as procedure, i.e., both as semantic and objective truth condition and, procedurally, as objective ways to determine truth conditions -so that a given intension (truth condition) may be associated with different procedures. Returning to a kind of example previously discussed, we might assert that a speaker who knows A -> B is able to apply a different computational procedure than one who knows A v B. Whoever knows that the two formulas are equivalent has a new knowledge: two different procedures bring about the same truth condition.
Thus, we need to give a representation not only of what the thought is, but also of how it is given, its mode of presentation (the expression of our computational capacities).
It is a property of the thought to be thinkable in different ways; we cannot separate into two realms an unstructured thought and a structured linguistic meaning: the thought has its own general structure (intensions) which is the source of all of its possible objective articulations, of different kinds of (context dependent) procedures. The two apparently contradictory theses in Frege are ultimately resolved through a careful assessment of two inextricably connected aspects of our thoughts.
